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Abstract
Victor Preller’s Divine Science and the Science of God makes an unjustly
neglected contribution to understanding the apophaticism of Thomas Aquinas
and, by extension, the possibilities and constraints of theological discourse. Preller
contends that, according to Thomas, God-talk can be meaningful though not
intelligible. That is, by faith one can know that one’s propositions refer to God;
one cannot, however, know how they do so. The first part of the article explains
the main inferences leading up to these conclusions. The second part attends
to some key passages in Thomas’ Summa Theologiae in order to substantiate
Preller’s interpretation. Spelling out these passages requires coming to grips with
Aquinas’ distinction between the ‘thing signified’ (res significata) and ‘mode of
signification’ (modus significandi). Armed with this second stock of concepts,
the argument doubles back on the conclusions already set out: building on
Preller, I argue that Thomas distinguishes between meaning and intelligibility
for semantic reasons, judgements about the practice of language which are
bound up with certain other ontological judgements. Throughout the article,
the virtues of this line of interpretation are compared and contrasted with the
position laid out in Kevin Hector’s article, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas: A
Reformulation and Recommendation’, Scottish Journal of Theology 60/4 (2007),
pp. 377–93.
Introduction
Consider for a moment the philosophical distance between Thomas Aquinas’
Summa Theologiae and Wilfrid Sellars’ Science, Perception and Reality – the idiomatic
sweeps, conceptual crags and lexical hollows which separate them. Now
imagine trying to bridge that monstrous gulf. Those struggling to imagine
such a project may prefer a real-life example: see Victor Preller’s Divine Science
and the Science of God, a ‘reconstruction’ and ‘translation’ of Thomas’ theological
epistemology and philosophy of language into a more contemporary
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(though perhaps no more familiar) mode of discourse – Sellars’ analytic
philosophy.1
For all the various stripes of Thomism on the current theological scene,
the ‘Prellerians’ are nowhere to be found. That, however, is not due to
Preller’s lack of importance. Quite the contrary, so little has been written
about Preller thus far because he was, and in many ways still is, ahead of
his time. ‘Preller’, writes Bruce Marshall, ‘is a kind of Melchizedek among
Thomists’, a forerunner ‘without father or mother or genealogy’.2 And yet,
he is not without heirs; rather, marks and tokens of Divine Science are turning
up with increasing frequency in the work of Preller’s former students and
sympathisers.3 They are a growing cast of characters, Preller’s progeny, a
diverse company of scholars whose influence suggests that the full legacy of
Divine Science remains to be seen.
1 Victor Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God: A Reformulatin of Thomas Aquinas (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967). Cited hereafter as Divine Science.
2 Bruce Marshall, ‘In Search of an Analytic Aquinas’, in Jeffrey Stout and Robert
MacSwain (eds), Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein (London: SCM,
2004), p. 56. Preller’s Divine Science predates what John Haldane and others have styled
‘Analytical Thomism’, a scholarly movement whose aims and ends have been cause
for recent debate. See Craig Paterson and Matthew S. Pugh (eds), Analytical Thomism:
Traditions in Dialogue (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006).
3 Preller’s adherents and allies include John Bowlin, David Burrell, Stanley Hauerwas,
Jennifer Herdt, George Lindbeck, Bruce Marshall, Eugene Rogers and the late William
Placher, just to name a few. The broad contours of Divine Science appear in Eugene Rogers
Jr, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) and William Placher, The Domestication of
Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God went Wrong (Louisville, KY: Westminster John
Knox Press, 1996). However, neither of these works focuses primarily on Divine Science,
nor do they treat Divine Science with the depth of attention that I do here. Stanley
Hauerwas’ Gifford Lectures (publ. as With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness
and Natural Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001)) owe an even greater deal
of inspiration to Preller. Hauerwas has noted that With the Grain of the Universe is, in
many ways, a reformulation of the lessons he learned from Divine Science. ‘Preller’,
writes Hauerwas, ‘thought and said better in 1967 what I was trying to say in
2001’ (Stanley Hauerwas, ‘Aquinas, Preller, Wittgenstein, and Hopkins’, in Stout and
McSwain, Grammar and Grace, p. 77). This just noted collection of essays, Grammar and
Grace, of which Preller is the dedicatee, is the most recent and pronounced sign of
Preller’s unassuming influence. Many of the essays found there, especially those by John
Bowlin and David Burrell, pay their respects to Preller’s influence on their respective
readings of Thomas. See also in the same volume Fergus Kerr’s ‘“Real Knowledge” or
“Enlightened Ignorance”: Eric Mascall on the Apophatic Thomisms of Victor Preller
and Victor White’ (pp. 103–23), which goes some way towards explaining some of
the reasons for the late-blooming reception of Divine Science.
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That said, the upshot of Divine Science is by no means a settled matter.
Admittedly, it is not hard to see why: Preller’s blend of disparate vocabularies
and concepts makes Divine Science an odd if not exceptionally difficult
interpretation of Thomas’ thought. Another reason for its difficulty is of
course the subject matter itself: in the first thirteen questions of the Summa
alone, Thomas introduces qualifications and distinctions so subtle that even
the most able reader is liable to lose her footing now and again.
Take the case of Kevin Hector’s article, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas:
A Reformulation and Recommendation’.4 Aimed at supplanting what Hector
styles a voguish (mis)reading of Thomas’ apophaticism – an interpretation
which he finds most convincingly expressed by Preller – Hector’s article
suggests that Divine Science writes a cheque it cannot cash: ‘according to Preller’,
writes Hector, ‘no passage in the Summa can be rightly understood apart from
Thomas’s “apophatic rule”, that “[i]n this life God is radically unintelligible”’.5
Not so, says Hector; Thomas’ apophaticism is less like a law than it is a
ladder – i.e. it is not a ‘rule’ but rather a conceptual tool which Thomas
provisionally employs to ascend new conceptual heights – and then kicks
away.6 Pace Preller, Hector argues that apophaticism is ‘simply one of the
tools Thomas uses to establish his overall argument, namely that we can
make meaningful statements about God’.7 In Hector’s view, Thomas applies
‘ordinary concepts of [creaturely] goods, with their usual meanings to God’.
Hector of course grants that there are crucial differences too: when applying
a term to God, for example, we must remember the disparity between divine
and creaturely being. That is, ‘[t]he difference in applying a term to God and
to creatures is ontological, not semantic’.8
Much of Hector’s argument unfolds with extraordinary precision. For
just that reason, it is also a pretty good example of how easy it is to get
Thomas wrong.9 For these reasons, I want to take Hector’s article as a point
of departure for coming to grips with Thomas’ apophaticism. In what follows
I argue that Hector misreads the thirteenth question of the Summa’s prima pars.
This tack, I hope, will help throw into relief Preller’s point in Divine Science –
namely that Thomas thinks we can make meaningful statements about God,
4 Kevin Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas: A Re-Formulation and
Recommendation’, Scottish Journal of Theology 60/4 (2007), pp. 377–93.
5 ‘Apophatic rule’ is Hector’s phrase, not Preller’s.
6 Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas’, p. 388.
7 Ibid., p. 380.
8 Ibid., p. 390.
9 The virtues of Hector’s article far outweigh its defects. Indeed, in my judgement, it is
one of the best expositions of Thomas’ account of positive predication that we have.
See esp. Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas’, pp. 381–8.
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even though on this side of glory we cannot know the meaning of such
statements. As we shall see, Preller’s distinction between meaning and
intelligibility helps make explicit some of the finer, albeit central, features of
Thomas’ apophaticism. To sustain these claims, I need to begin with a brief
look at Thomas’ epistemology.
Thomas’ epistemology
Every act of cognition, says Thomas, is a composite operation of the sensory
system and the intellect (I.77.5).10 So to render any object intelligible, I
must first have a sense-impression (e.g. a visual image) of the object. For ‘it
is natural to man to attain intellectual truths through sensible objects, because
all of our knowledge originates from sense’ (I.1.9). Consider the matter this
way. While walking through the woods I spy my first red-bellied woodpecker;
in this moment, I apprehend the woodpecker as a ‘mental image’
(phantasmate) – an immaterial ‘intention’ which is not formally identical
with or reducible to the bird itself.11 Here we may note that Thomas’
epistemology opposes the late modern ‘Myth of the Given’.12 For Thomas,
knowing ‘involves a real creation of a new form by the conceptual powers of
the mind itself, so that the concept of “what the object is” (its true nature) is
never merely “given” in sense experience’.13 The ‘real form’ of the external
object, to quote Preller, ‘does not inform the intellect – the intellect informs
itself, on the basis of sense experience, of that which sense experience does
not actually contain – the nature of the external object’.14 Thomas holds that,
10 With two exceptions, all parenthetic citations refer to Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica,
trans. the Fathers of the English Domincan Province (New York: Benziger Brothers,
1948). The remaining two instances (which I mark by footnote) also refer to the
Summa, though I have used the English trans. provided in the Blackfriars edn, Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Herbert McCabe, vol. 3 (New York: CUP, 1964). In all
cases, Roman numerals indicate the part, followed by Arabic numerals, which indicate
the question and article. Objections ‘obj’. and replies to objections ‘ad’ are likewise
indicated by Arabic numeral. A sed contra takes an ‘s.c’. and introduction takes an ‘int’.
Quotations from the body of Thomas’ response are cited without further specification.
11 See ST I.12.3; I.78.3, 8; I.84–5. For the sake of continuity with Hector and Preller,
when translating Thomas’ phantasmate I substitute ‘mental image’ for ‘phantasm’.
12 Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality, International Library of Philosophy and
Scientific Method (New York: Humanities Press, 1963). In other circumstances, I
might need to consider objections to this perhaps proto-Kantian, proto-Sellarsian
formulation of Thomas’ epistemology. But since my aim here is to set forth Preller’s
reading of Thomas, and since Hector also endorses this part of Preller’s reading, I leave
such considerations aside. See Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas’, p. 382,
n. 15.
13 Preller, Divine Science, p. 42.
14 Ibid., p. 42.
20
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0036930611000822
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:26:44, subject to the Cambridge Core
The Apophaticism of Aquinas and Preller
from the very first moment of cognition, sensible objects do not show up as
so many mere givens of sense experience. Rather, they are produced by the soul
itself and ordered to the operations of the intellect (I.78.1).15
Notice though what this does not mean: for Thomas, my ‘mental image’
of a woodpecker is not yet a ‘conscious state’ or that of which my ‘mind’ is
conscious.16 ‘For vision [of an object] is made actual only when the thing
seen is in a certain way in the seer’ (I.12.3). To be seen ‘in a certain way’ – i.e.
to be understood as a woodpecker, a second ‘moment’ of cognition is required:
my agent intellect must correlate the mental image of the sensible object with
its concept (conceptio intellectus) (I.78.1; 84.6).17 Also note that Thomas would
not construe the concept ‘woodpecker’ – or any concept for that matter – in
terms of an innate form or species of the mind (I.84.3). Following Aristotle,
he holds that the intellect derives its concepts from repeated interaction with
sensible reality. Call this process ‘composition and division’ – the finer points
of which I shall return to shortly (I.84.4; 85.5).
Now since all of our knowledge is derived from (1) the apprehension
of sensible objects and (2) the conceptualisation of those objects, it follows
that ‘in the present state of life . . . immaterial substances cannot be known
by human investigation’ (I.88.1, s.c.). And since God is immaterial, it would
seem that we cannot know God (I.3.2). An apparent lesson, then, of Thomas’
epistemology is that we cannot know the divine essence in this life.18 So
Thomas: ‘It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God
by its own natural power’ (I.12.4). ‘For knowledge’, he continues:
is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing
known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence
the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If
therefore the mode of anything’s being exceeds the mode of the knower,
it must result that the knowledge of that object is above the nature of
the knower. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.
(I.12.4)19
Knowledge of God and the language of faith
I take it that the foregoing represents an uncontroversial reading of Thomas’
epistemology. It is one with which Hector, at any rate, registers no
15 Ibid., p. 39.
16 Ibid.
17 Cf. I.78.3 and 8.
18 Cf. Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas’, p. 379.
19 Hector’s summary of the inferences leading up to this point is especially instructive.
See Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas’, p. 382.
21
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0036930611000822
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:26:44, subject to the Cambridge Core
scottish journal of theology
complaints. His disagreement ‘lies in the conclusion which Preller draws
from this reading’.20 How Thomas’ epistemology redounds on the question
of meaning and God-talk – that is where the road begins to fork. According
to Hector, Thomas judges that we can make meaningful statements about
God.21 To be sure, that is not a conclusion I wish to dispute. The point
where Hector runs foul of Thomas’ position – a point which Preller, on the
other hand, maps out so clearly – is that, according to Thomas, God-talk
is also unintelligible. This simultaneous affirmation of meaning and denial of
intelligibility may strike us as a paradox. It need not, however. For, as we
shall see, the intelligibility and meaning of God-talk are two separate matters.
A further look at some of the crucial moves in Preller’s reading helps make
sense of this distinction.
For Thomas, to have a science ‘of’ something – be it woodpeckers, politics,
God or otherwise – the subject of inquiry must be expressible in words.
And in order to talk about something, we must be able to refer to it in
a meaningful way (I.1.7).22 Our overt linguistic acts (verbal and written
utterances) are able to signify because they express ‘intellectual concepts’
(conceptiones intellectus) which, as we have seen, are themselves about things.23
‘To have a significant concept of an object is’, as Preller puts it, ‘to possess an
intention of that object’. So when a significant concept is used to refer, the agent
intends the object to which it refers.24 Hence, to intend an object one must
at least know what kind of thing it is. Any significant reference to an object
must therefore ‘imply that at some level of analysis it is a sort of thing’ –
that it belongs to at least one general class of possible referents.25
Here a difficulty arises: Thomas considers theology (theologia) – or more
colloquially, ‘talk about God’ (sermo de Deo) – ‘the science of God’ (scientia Dei)
(I.1.7 s.c.).26 But in order to refer to God, it seems that we must be able
to ‘intend him’ – to have a concept of God ‘in mind’. To have a concept
of something is at least to have some vague notion of what it is. And as we
have seen, Aquinas thinks that we cannot know ‘what God is’ (Deo quid sit)
20 Ibid., p. 382, n. 15.
21 Ibid., p. 380.
22 Cf. Preller, Divine Science, p. 4.
23 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia super Peri hermenias, I.2, trans. Jean T. Oesterle as Aristotle: On
Interpretation, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation, 11 (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1962).
24 Preller, Divine Science, p. 5.
25 Ibid., p. 10.
26 I am concerned here only with the sort of theology that Thomas considers sacra doctrina,
which proceeds from God’s self-revelation in holy scripture, and so is distinguished
from the philosophers’ claims about divinity. cf. ST I.1, ad. 2.
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because we have no means for considering ‘how God is’ (Deo quomodo sit)
(I.3, int.).27 Just so, God cannot be located within a general class (I.3.5).
Since the world of sense-experience is what ‘anchors’ the concepts we use
to refer, all existential references – if they are to be significant for us – must
be formed with recourse to sense-experience. But God transcends the world
of sense-experience and so is unrelated to our concepts and the conceptual
frameworks in which they occur (I.13.1). Thus, it seems that there can be
no conceptually significant intention of what God is, how he is or of how he
relates to things.28 ‘It is not clear, then’, writes Preller, that ‘we can intend
[God] or (intelligibly) intend to refer to him’.29
At this stage, Preller’s reading runs the risk of sounding strange if not
patently false. After all, Thomas goes on to say quite a lot about God. In
point of fact, Preller insists that Thomas is never interested in anything less
than theological truth, that even when interpreting Aristotle he writes not
as a philosopher but as catholicae veritatis doctor.30 But how can Preller square
these claims? On the one hand, he seems to suggest that Thomas thinks it
impossible to talk meaningfully about God. But on the other hand, Preller says
that proper theological discourse is Thomas’ sole motivating concern. The
puzzle dissolves with a distinction, a grammatical reminder of sorts: Thomas
thinks God-talk is unintelligible – not meaningless. Overlook the difference here
and you miss Thomas’ point, says Preller. Making sense of Preller’s distinction
calls for a closer look at Thomas’ account of concept formation.
Recall Thomas’ view that we render sensible objects intelligible by
pairing their mental images with concepts, which are derived from
repeated interaction with sensible objects. This process, what Thomas calls
‘composition and division’, is a comparative affair: ‘the human intellect . . .
necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division;
and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is
the process of reasoning’ (I.85.5). In other words, we specify a concept
by grasping a collection of syntactic rules for relating it to various other
concepts. Take the case of a circle. I come to grasp the conceptual content
of the concept ‘circle’ by understanding a collection of rules for relating
it to a larger conceptual framework, a stock of concepts including those
which name four-sided shapes, figures whose interior angles add up to 180
degrees and so forth. Preller’s shorthand way of putting the matter is that we
27 Cf. Preller, Divine Science, p. 10.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 5.
30 Ibid., p. 22. cf. Victor Preller, ‘Water into Wine’, in Stout and McSwain, Grammar and
Grace, p. 262.
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find ourselves using a ‘conceptual system’ – a constellation of ‘syntactical
interrelations’ which describes a ‘logical space’.31
To this we may add a corollary claim: the marks and sounds of our overt
linguistic acts (scriptura and vox) are significant insofar as they express concepts
within the logical space of our conceptual system.32 A word or family of
words signifies a concept just if it holds a specifiable syntactical status, if it
can occur in some statements (or families of statements) but not others.33
The intelligibility of language is in other words a formal or syntactical matter. If
we did not use language to refer to things, then the meaning of a word would
also be a point of mere syntax. Of course, we use words to refer to things all
the time; the meaning of a word or family of words is therefore determined
both by its status in the conceptual system and
its use in referring to ‘that which is’.34 The meaning of the word ‘exist’,
for example, is intelligible within our conceptual system when used in
connection with sensible objects, ideas, literary characters, etc. Novas,
quasars, Captain Ahab, and woodpeckers – in each case we can determine
the kind of claim being made by ‘x exists’. It would not be clear, on
the other hand, what ‘exists’ could mean in vacuo – what it could mean
apart from the severally related conceptual frameworks generated by our
conceptual system.35
Earlier I said that, according to Thomas, God cannot be intelligibly defined
in terms of our conceptual system. Hopefully, the above remarks have lifted
some of the fog surrounding this claim: it just means we do not have access
to the syntactical rules by means of which something significant could be
said of ‘God’. That is, within the context of our conceptual structure we
simply do not know what it could mean to say something like ‘God exists’.
However, just because our conceptual system cannot intelligibly refer to
God does not mean that none could do so. For Thomas, nothing tells against the
possibility of modes of experience and ‘inner states’ radically unlike our own.
Nor is there any reason why these modes of experience could not form the
basis for an alternate conceptual system which might enable descriptions of
various objects which radically differ from our current descriptions. More,
such a conceptual system could engender an ‘ideal language’ in terms of
which one might more adequately know and experience said objects. Further
31 Preller, Divine Science, p. 10.
32 Cf. Sententia super Peri hermenias, I.2.
33 Preller, Divine Science, p. 45.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 150.
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still, all this could engender the knowledge and description of certain objects
which exist in reality but which we do not now experience.36 By Thomas’
lights, it is actuality which implies these possibilities. That is, Thomas knows
of a bona fide alternate conceptual and linguistic system, namely the one
possessed by the blessed (beati). Unlike the believer in via who cannot see
God, by the light of glory (lumen gloriae) the blessed ‘see Him as He is’ (1 John
2:2) (I.12.1 s.c. and ad. 1). They know God not by ‘mental images’ but
rather ‘through the Divine essence alone [which is] present to the intellect,
by which also God himself is seen’ (I.12.9). The blessed, then, possess a
mode of experience and intellection radically unlike our own. Seeing God
‘as He is’, they have an adequate intention of the very nature of God by
which they can conceptualise what we cannot – the ‘whatness’ or form of
God.37
But precisely what does this have to do with those who are still in via?
Quite a lot, actually. Thomas understands scientia dei as primarily and radically
‘God’s own eternal act of knowing, both as possessed immanently of God,
and as directly and intrinsically participated by the beati through the visio
dei’.38 Though the visio dei is an exclusively eschatological reality, there is a
sense in which humans in via can already participate in such knowledge. This
possibility is, however, strictly a divine possibility. Only by faith, which God
moves in us ‘inwardly by grace’ (II-II.61.1), may we ‘believe God’ (credere in
Deum) (II-II.2.9). Only thus may the believer assent to the ‘matters of faith’
(II-II.2.3, ad. 2) revealed by God in the sacred doctrine of holy scripture,
which itself participates in the scientia dei.39 Even so, the lumen fidei of the
believer in via is not yet the lumen gloriae of the blessed. Bereft of this latter
light, the believer cannot yet grasp intellectually or conceptually what she
asserts ‘in the light of faith’. No, she only possesses non-intelligible ‘articles’
of faith, which she believes to be ‘created analogues’ of the scientia dei shared
by God and the blessed.40
36 Ibid., p. 74.
37 Ibid., p. 233.
38 Ibid.
39 To this point, see also Bruce D. Marshall, ‘Quod Scit Una Uetula: Aquinas on the Nature
of Theology’, in Rik van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (eds), The Theology of
Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), pp. 1–35. It
is worth noting here, if only to assuage (what I consider to be valid) Barthian anxieties
that Thomas understands the holy scriptures as a divinely inspired witness to Jesus
Christ, God’s self-revelation ‘upon which sacred scripture is founded’ (ST I.1.2, ad 2
in fin). See also Eugene F. Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural
Knowledge of God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), p. 19.
40 Preller, Divine Science, p. 234.
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‘Created analogue’ is Preller’s term of art. What he intends by the concept,
however, is vintage Thomas. That the language of faith consists of created
analogues means that the conceptual system of the blessed contains words and
expressions whose roles are ‘syntactically isomorphic’ – somehow similar
in form and relation – with ours.41 It does not imply, however, that the
believer understands this isomorphism. For to understand how the language
of faith makes real claims, she must understand how scientia dei ‘works’ –
i.e. the believer must understand the syntactical rules which govern ‘blessed
language’. But this she cannot do. To say then that the believer ‘understands’
is to ‘claim that there corresponds to his faith-propositions a reality in God,
but it is not to say that the believer understands how his faith propositions
make a real claim about the nature of God’.42
To be clear, Preller does not suggest that Thomas denies the possibility
of meaningful God-talk. Rather, Preller argues that, by the gift of faith, the
believer possesses a supernatural ‘intention’ by which her affirmations of the
language of faith are meaningful – i.e. have ‘real referential and descriptive
power’. The meaning of such statements, however, is only intelligible to God
and the blessed.43 The intelligibility of God-talk for those in via is thus a
matter of eschatological hope.
Thus far Preller’s reading of Thomas. In what follows, I want to shore up
the textual plausibility of this reading by paying close attention to some key
passages in the Summa. Here too Hector remains an instructive conversation
partner – not because I agree with everything he writes, but rather because
precisely at the point where Hector’s reading lacks textual support, Preller’s
emerges as all the more convincing.
Signifying God’s essence
Hector correctly notes that Thomas thinks we can properly signify God’s
essence, even though only certain terms suffice for doing so. Thomas
argues that ‘negative names’, for example, ‘do not at all signify [God’s]
substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from him or his
relation to something else’ (I.13.2). In other words, to say what God is
not is not yet to say what God is.44 Terms of perfection, for example, ‘good,
wise, and the like’, on the other hand, do ‘signify the divine substance,
and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full
41 Cf. ibid., p. 153.
42 Ibid., p. 262.
43 Ibid.
44 Cf. Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas’, pp. 388–9.
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representation of him’ (I.13.2). Setting aside for a moment the question
of why they ‘fall short of a full representation’, we may note that terms of
perfection substantially signify God because ‘God prepossesses in himself all
the perfections of creatures, being himself simply and universally perfect.
‘Hence’, Thomas continues, ‘every creature represents him, and is like him
so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents him not as something
of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form
the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto’
(I.13.2). As Hector explains, this means that the significance of a positive,
‘substantial’ predication about God is grounded in the ‘fact that all creatures
tend toward God as the telos of their being’. To say, then, that ‘God is wise’
is to suggest that ‘insofar as any creature is wise, that wisdom depends upon
and tends toward that wisdom which is proper to God’.45 And so it goes for
other terms of perfection: ‘[a]s regards what is signified by these names, they
belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures,
and are applied primarily to him’ (I.13.3).
Caution is needed at this point, here where the interpretative thorns
thicken. Thomas is not suggesting that a term of perfection can be applied to
God tout court. Lest we think so, Hector rightly insists on a major qualification:
whereas perfections exist severally in creatures, according to Thomas ‘they
preexist in God unitedly’. Just so, ‘when any term expressing perfection is
applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other
perfections’ (I.13.5). That is, when applied to God a term of perfection ‘leaves
the thing signified as incomprehended and as exceeding the signification of
the name’ (I.13.5). One can by now imagine how Preller might interpret this
last quotation. Contrast this with Hector, who takes it in a nearly opposite
direction: according to Hector, Thomas thinks the difference in applying a
term to God is precisely not semantic but rather ontological – and only merely
that.
With this ontological, not semantic difference in mind, however, Thomas
appears to suggest that concepts themselves mean the same thing when
predicated of God and creatures. . . . Thomas’s account . . . is not intended
as a way of saying that our concepts only ‘sort of’ mean the same thing
when applied to God and creatures, but that a single concept – with a
consistent meaning – is applied to two very different sorts of things, and
that we must keep these differences in mind. When we say, therefore, that
‘God is wise’, the term ‘wise’ means the same thing it always does – but
since it is applied to God, we must remember that God’s wisdom is not
45 Ibid., p. 389.
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distinct from God’s love, God’s mercy, God’s justice, etc. The difference
in applying a term to God and to creatures is ontological, not semantic.46
Evidence of Thomas’ ‘ontological, not semantic’ distinction is supposedly
borne out in his treatment of divine love:
since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is
manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because
since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved
by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not
the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or
imaginary, calls forth our love . . . whereas the love of God infuses and
creates goodness. (I.20.2)47
For both God and creatures, to love means to will good to the object of one’s
love. There is of course a major difference between divine and creaturely
love: whereas our love is called forth by the things we deem good, God’s love
creates a thing’s goodness. The difference here, Hector insists, is grounded
solely in the ontological difference between creator and creature.
In sum, Hector attributes to Thomas the following claims: (a) we can make
positive predications about God’s essence by affirming the pre-existence in
God of some creaturely good. In doing so, we may (b) apply ordinary
concepts of these goods with their usual meanings to God, though (c)
we must recognise the ontological, not semantic difference between talk
about the creaturely and the divine. And now I want to say: doubtless,
Thomas holds to some version of (a). Claims (b) and (c), however, nearly
get things backwards. In fact, Thomas teaches that we can apply ordinary
concepts to God so long as we do not use their usual meanings. More, he
holds this position precisely for semantic reasons, which, as we shall see, are
not unrelated to ontological concerns. A brief tour of Thomas’ distinction
between the ‘thing signified’ (res significata) and the ‘mode of signification’
(modus significandi) sheds light on these matters.48
46 Ibid., p. 390.
47 Ibid., p. 391.
48 The following explanation of the relations between the modus essendi, modus intelligendi and
modus significandi is further explicated in Gregory P. Rocca OP, Speaking the Incomprehensible
God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 2004) and id., ‘The Distinction between Res Significata
and Modus Significandi in Aquinas’s Theological Epistemology’, The Thomist 55/2 (1991),
pp. 173–99. Thomas was not the first to employ these concepts theologically; for a
detailed explanation of their provenance in medieval theological literature, see Ire`ne
Rosier, ‘Res significata et modus significandi: Les implications d’une distinction me´die´vale’,
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Res significata and modus significandi
Thomas’ distinction between the res significata and the modus significandi finds
its feet in a more complex web of distinctions between the ‘mode of
being’ (modus essendi) and ‘mode of understanding’ (modus intelligendi).49 In
Thomas’ day, the latter three notions constituted a conceptual triad, a series
of theoretical links between ontology, epistemology and philosophy of
language. In broad contours, the triad suggests that, for any given object, the
modus essendi pertains to the ‘thing itself’ (res significata), which is intended by
an intellectual concept (conceptus) as determined by the agent’s modus intelligendi.
An intellectual concept, when verbalised by an overt linguistic sound (vox)
is called a word (dictio) insofar as its use in linguistic practice confers on it
a determinate mode of signification (modus significandi). In other words, it is
only in connection with its use in judgement and action that a concept has
the conceptual content it does have. Notice also that, for Thomas, the way a
word signifies is directly related to the concepts of the intellect, which are
intentions of reality. It follows that the modus significandi of a word is contingent
upon our modus intelligendi, by which we apprehend an object’s modus essendi –
not as ‘a given’ but rather by way of intention.
When ‘naming God’, Thomas employs these concepts to claim that every
positive, proper term which we apply to God must be considered from three
perspectives: (1) the thing it signifies (res significata) – which in the case of
God is the divine essence, (2) the meaning of the term (ratio nominis) as it
is ordinarily determined within a particular language, which is grounded in
our modus intelligendi, and (3) its mode of signification (modus significandi), the
way it signifies, which is determined by its application in linguistic practice.
A clearer picture of how Thomas uses these concepts emerges in two key
passages which directly bear down on the larger matter at hand. First this:
[O]ur knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow
from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent
way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in
creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore
as to the names applied to God, there are two things to be considered –
viz. the perfections which they signify (perfectiones ipsas significatas), such
as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification (modum
significandi). As regards what is signified by these names, they belong
properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and
in Sten Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachtheorien in Spa¨tantike und Mittelalter (Tu¨bingen: G. Narr, 1995),
pp. 135–68.
49 I retain the Latin terminology in this section in order to underscore their technical
status in Thomas’ oeuvre.
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are applied properly to him. But as regards their mode of signification
(modum significandi), they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their
mode of signification applies to creatures. (I.13.3)50
In the above respondeo, Thomas leads off with a typical distinction between
the modus essendi, modus intelligendi and modus significandi. Having already established
God’s eminent perfections (I.4), here he sets in relief the way we may know
and speak of them. It seems plain to Thomas ‘that in this life we cannot see the
essence of God’ – that, in other words, in this life we do not have immediate
access to the divine modus essendi (1.13.1).51 No, our knowledge is determined
by our human modus intelligendi and so we can only apprehend God’s perfections
‘as they are in creatures’. Neither then may we transcend our creaturely modus
significandi. Since ‘words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things’,
it follows that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the
medium of the intellectual conception (I.13.1). We must bear in mind, says
Thomas, that a term of perfection stands for a concept whose meaning (ratio
nominis) is determined by the intellect’s intention of sensible reality. So for
any putative res significata we must not forget that the way – to be sure, the only
way – we can refer to it is with the determinate meanings of the concepts at
our disposal. ‘Therefore as to the names applied to God, there are two things
to be considered – viz. the perfections which they signify (perfectiones ipsas
significatas) . . . and their mode of signification (modum significandi)’ (I.13.3).
As regards ‘what is signified by these names’, we know that perfections
‘belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures’
(I.13.3). In other words, considered from the perspective of God’s modus
essendi, God just is eminent perfection. Insofar as the ordinary meanings of
our concepts and terms of perfection could refer to God’s essence, they
could be ‘applied properly to him’. But that is precisely what Thomas says
the ordinary meanings of our words and concepts cannot do: ‘as regards their
mode of signification (modum significandi), they do not properly and strictly
apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures’ (I.13.3).
And again: ‘affirmations about God are vague . . . or “incongruous” inasmuch
as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification’
(I.13.12, ad. 1).52
What, then, is Thomas up to? If the ordinary meanings of our words
do not apply to God, then exactly what is Thomas doing when he says
‘God is wise’? He insists that such propositions are true (I.13.12). But how
does he know this? Might he be suggesting that we do not know how such
50 Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas’, p. 389.
51 Cf. I.12.11, 12.
52 Cf. I.33.2, ad. 4, I.39.2.
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propositions are true, that our words refer to God in ways beyond what we
now understand? The answer, I think, is clear enough when considering
passages like this one:
Thus also this term wise applied to man in some degree circumscribes
and comprehends the thing signified (rem significandi); whereas this is not
the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as
incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence
it is evident that this term ‘wise’ is not applied in the same way to God
and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. (I.13.5)53
Thomas could hardly put a finer point on the matter. Pace Hector, Thomas
clearly states that our concepts do not mean the same thing when applied
to God and creatures. Ordinarily, what we mean by ‘wise’ is the concept
formed by repeated interaction with sensible objects (I.13.4). Grandfathers,
red foxes, and discerning spouses – we call these things wise and, if pressed,
we can give an account of how the term is being used. Things go differently
with God. One must use ‘wise’ and suchlike terms ‘without any indication
of how these perfections are possessed’ (I.13.3, ad.1).54 For what these terms
‘signify does not belong to God in the way they signify it, but in a higher
way’ (I.13.3, ad. 2).55 This is because, for Thomas, it is the use of the concept
‘wise’ in judgement and action which confers its conceptual content. Given
the constraints on human knowledge of God which Thomas assumes, it
seems that applying the concept ‘wise’ to God loads it with content which
we cannot grasp. We may use the concept in this way, with respect to God,
but in doing so its conceptual content is transformed in ways which render it
unintelligible to us – even though by faith we consider such uses thoroughly
appropriate.
Also notice – again pace Hector – why this is so: precisely for semantic
reasons! A word’s syntactic relation to other words determines the way it
ordinarily signifies. But in the context of God-talk, the ordinary syntactical
meaning of a word is ‘exceeded’. Granted, this semantic distinction comes
packaged with important ontological and epistemological distinctions as
well. The disparity between the modus essendi of the res significata – the divine
essence – and our creaturely life engenders two very different sorts of modi
intelligendi and therefore also two very different sorts of modi significandi. Our
words are verbal signs of intellectual concepts, formed exclusively by repeated
interaction with sensible reality – which the being of God transcends. The
53 Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas’, p. 390.
54 Emphasis added. I have used the Blackfriars English trans. here.
55 I have used the Blackfriars English trans. here.
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difference then in applying a term to God and creatures is semantic precisely
because of the ontological distinction between these referents.
An example helps to illustrate these points. Take the case of the concept
‘love’. According to Hector, Thomas holds that ‘love’ when applied to God
means ‘just what it means when predicated of creatures . . . To love means to
will good to the thing loved – and this holds true whether we predicate love
of God or of creatures.’56 Supposedly, the only difference is that ‘when I love
something’, writes Hector, ‘my love is a response to that thing’s goodness,
but when God loves something, that love generates the thing’s goodness. I
love, and God loves, and “love” means the same thing when predicated of
either – but my love responds, whereas God’s love creates’.57 This difference
aside, ‘the conceptual content is just the same. When we apply the concept
to God, the concept itself does not change.’58 But of course it does! It is
doubtful that we could even ‘sort of’ know what it means to love as God
does, in a way which actually creates the goodness of things. Again, words
express concepts – i.e. intentions of sensible reality. We can formulate the
concept ‘love’, followed by the concepts ‘create’, ‘thing’ and ‘goodness’
according to our creaturely modes of being, knowing and signifying. But we
cannot conceive of how to use these concepts in such a way as to render
‘love creates a thing’s goodness’ intelligible. Granted, the gracious love of
one human being for another may indeed create good in that other. Likewise,
we mark the absence of love by noting the negation of its creative effects. The
point here, however, is that God’s love creates good out of nothing and, perhaps
no less mysteriously, extends to those whom we cannot imagine loving –
those whose wickedness has reduced them to nearly nothing. We just do
not know what it would be like to love something and so create its goodness ex
nihilo. We have simply never had the occasion to use ‘love’ in that way. Still
less could we explain those propositions which would render this use of the
term intelligible.
Thus, Hector’s reading misses the mark. Thomas knows that the
propositions ‘God is wise’ and ‘God is love’ are true. He does not, however,
know how they are true because one of our concepts when applied to God
cannot mean ‘the same thing it always does’.59 Contrary to Hector’s reading,
Thomas teaches that we can apply ordinary concepts to God so long as we
do not use their usual meanings. And this is for semantic reasons, judgements
56 Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas’, p. 391.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 390.
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about language which are of course bound up with ontological judgements
as well.
Conclusion
Preller’s Divine Science does not interpret Thomas’ apophaticism as a denial
of the possibility of meaningful God-talk – far from it. Rather, as I have
argued, Preller suggests that we can say quite a lot about God and that,
by faith, we can know that our propositions about God are true – just not
how. We have also seen how Divine Science, when set vis-a`-vis a reading like
Hector’s, emerges as the more textually plausible of the two readings of the
Summa. Thus, just as the foregoing tracks the main lines of Thomas’ position
in the Summa, so also does it underscore the enduring promise of Divine
Science – not only as a plausible interpretation of Thomas’ thought, but as a
theological work in its own right. Preller did not live, move and have his being
in precisely the same philosophical idioms, vocabularies and conceptual
distinctions as did Thomas; nor must we wholly adopt Preller’s terms of art
in order to take his and Thomas’ point – namely, the intelligibility of God-
talk follows from grasping the material content of the concepts it employs. If
one cannot grasp that content, then one cannot use those concepts intelligibly.
Still, we may know by faith that those concepts have material content and
can be employed meaningfully once the rules of meaningful predication
(what Thomas develops in I.2–12) are known. But knowing the rules of
the language of faith and grasping the material content of its concepts are
different matters. Just so, one might be able to speak meaningfully of God,
use various concepts to predicate various things of God, without being able
to render those utterances intelligible. The lesson here is one of gratitude
and humility. For it is by grace that we may now participate in the scientia
dei. And yet, our mode of participation in such knowledge is for now but a
‘making of motions in a language we do not yet understand’.60
60 Preller, Divine Science, p. 268. My thanks go to John Bowlin, Kevin Hector and Robert
Jenson for their help with an earlier version of this article.
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